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WHAT SHOULD You NOTICE WHEN You GET NOTICE?:
UNDISCOVERED BUT DISCOVERABLE ENVIRONMENTAL
CLAIMS IN BANKRUPTCY
ROYANNE KASHIWAHARA

Doi* & H. HAMNER HILL"

This paper addresses one of the presently unresolved areas of conflict
between bankruptcy law and environmental law. Specifically, what, if any,
are the duties of a party holding an undiscovered, but discoverable,
environmental claim upon being given notice of the bankruptcy filing by the
person against whom the claim can be brought? Two recent cases, giving
stunningly incompatible answers to this question, highlight the issue in
conflict: In re Texaco, Inc.' and AM International,Inc. v. DatacardCorp.2
I. GENERAL PUBLIC POLICY CONFLICT

Bankruptcy law provides uniform mechanisms designed to serve
multiple goals.' Originally designed for seizing and equitably distributing the
assets of insolvent debtors to creditors, bankruptcy mechanisms also
simultaneously ensure that insolvent debtors are not left destitute so that they

' Tokyo affiliate of Oliver, Lau, Lawhn, et al., B.A., Washington University, St.
Louis,
1984; J.D., U.C.L.A. 1987.
.. Department of Philosophy and Religion, Southeast Missouri State University,
One
University Place, Cape Girardeau, MO 63701, on leave, 1997-98 at the University of
Northern Iowa. A.B., College of William and Mary, 1978; J.D., Marshall-Wythe School of
Law, College of William and Mary, 1981; M.A., Washington University in St. Louis, 1983;
Ph.D., Washington University in St. Louis, 1985.
182 B.R. 937 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1995).
2 146 B.R. 391 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1992), aff'd in part, 106 F.3d 1342 (7th Cir. 1997).
The Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, Pub. L. 95-598, 92 Stat. 2594 (1978), was codified
as amended at 11 U.S.C. §§ 101-1330 (1994 & Supp. 11995), and commonly is referred to
as the Bankruptcy Code.
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might have a meaningful fresh start.4 Since the promulgation of the
Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978 ("Bankruptcy Code"),5 bankruptcy law also
has provided options for the discharge of debts through reorganization rather
than liquidation, allowing debtors to develop their own repayment plans
without losing substantial assets.6
Environmental law, on the other hand, responds "to the vast threats
to public health and safety presented by unsafe disposal of toxic chemicals
and hazardous substances. 7 The goal of the Comprehensive Environmental
Response, Compensation, and Liability Act of 1980 ("CERCLA"),8 for
example, is to promote both spontaneous cleanup by private parties and
equitable distribution of cleanup costs among the responsible parties. 9
The problem arises where environmental law imposes liability for
cleanup costs on a responsible party who files for bankruptcy protection. It
is generally well settled that cleanup costs constitute claims, which are
dischargeable in bankruptcy.'0 If the debtor is responsible for hazardous
waste dumping, then a fresh start in bankruptcy under either Chapter 7 or
Chapter I11" will thwart the goal of having responsible parties pay the costs
of cleanup. If liability for the cleanup stays with the debtor responsible for

' See, e.g., 11 U.S.C. § 332(d)(1)-(3) (allowing debtors to exempt certain property from
liquidation, including $15,000 interest in a residence as well as $800 worth of selected
personal property).
' Pub. L. 95-598, 92 Stat. 2594 (1978) (codified as amended at 11 U.S.C. §§ 101-1330
(1994 & Supp. 1 1995)).
6 See 11 U.S.C. §§ 1101-1174.
7 In re National Gypsum Co., 139 B.R. 397, 403 (Bankr. N.D. Tex 1992)
(citing Voluntary Purchasing Group v. Reilly, 889 F.2d 1380 (5th Cir. 1989)).
42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-9675 (1994 & Supp. 1 1995).
9 See generally In re National Gypsum Co., 139 B.R. at 403-06 (discussing
the background and purpose of CERCLA).
0 The Bankruptcy Code defines a claim as the "right to payment, whether or not such right
is reduced to judgment, liquidated, unliquidated, fixed, contingent, matured, unmatured,
disputed, undisputed, legal, equitable, secured, or unsecured." 11 U.S.C. § 101(5)(a)-(b).
" Chapter 7 is a liquidation provision, while Chapter 11 allows for reorganization. See
id. §§ 701-766, 1101-1174.

1997]

WHAT SHOULD You NOTICE

the pollution, then the debtor does not get a fresh start. In either case, it is
clear that one policy will suffer at the expense of another; a polluter's clean
site is generally incompatible with a debtor's clean slate. Presumably, the
Chapter 7 debtor does not have enough money to pay for cleanup costs.
Alternatively, if held responsible for cleanup costs, there is a greatly
increased chance that a Chapter 11 reorganization debtor will end up in
Chapter 7 liquidation. 2 In either case, the costs of cleanup are not borne by
the party responsible for the pollution.
A particularly interesting issue arises concerning the bankruptcy
discharge of environmental claims that were unmanifested, and undiscovered,
but discoverable, at the time that the party responsible for the pollution filed
for bankruptcy protection. Should unspecified CERCLA claims related to
undiscovered, but discoverable, pre-petition release of hazardous waste be
discharged in bankruptcy?
II. BRIEF SUMMARY OF THE TEXACO CASE

A 1995 installment of Texaco, Inc. v. Pennzoil, Co., 3 this
country's largest civil damages suit 4 and one of the largest corporate
bankruptcies in history, 5 answered this question in the affirmative and

2

See id. § 1112 (describing debtor's right to convert from a chapter 11 to a chapter 7

case).
13 Texaco, Inc. v. Pennzoil, Co., 729 S.W.2d 768 (Tex. Ct. App. 1987). It should be noted
that one corporate bankruptcy can result in multiple lawsuits spanning many years. The
Texaco bankruptcy is a particularly good example. See id.

" Pennzoil sued Texaco for inducing Getty Oil to breach an oral contract to sell Getty to
Pennzoil. See In re Texaco Inc., 182 B.R. 937, 941 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1995). The case was
heard in a Texas state court where the measure of damages for breach of a contract to sell is
treble the value of the object to be sold. Given fluctuations in the oil market, the value of
Getty's reserves at the time of the breach was $3.5 billion producing a whopping $10.5
billion judgement for Pennzoil. See id. To make matters worse, Texas required an appeals
bond equal to 125% of the judgement. See id Thus, to appeal, Texaco would have to post

a bond of almost $13 billion. See id. Bankruptcy, even for a corporation as large as Texaco,
was an attractive option.
"5 See In re Texaco Inc., 182 B.R. at 941.
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demonstrated the significance of that little piece of paper called the Notice of
Bankruptcy. In 1987, Texaco filed for Chapter 11, not because of any
environmental claims, but because of a $10.5 billion verdict in favor of
Pennzoil.16 A year later, Texaco's pre-petition debts were discharged. 7
Later, claimants who had been given notice of the bankruptcy, but who had
not filed any claims against the estate, discovered migrating contaminated
water, and sued Texaco in state court.' 8 Texaco asserted, as one of its
defenses, that any environmental claim against it was discharged in
bankruptcy.' 9 In the state court action, the claimants filed a motion to strike
Texaco's affirmative defense of bankruptcy discharge.2" Texaco responded
by filing, in bankruptcy court, a motion to reopen the bankruptcy case.2
Despite the fact that the claimants alleged that their environmental
claims were unmanifested and unknown at the time of the debtor's
bankruptcy, the court in Texaco determined that the claims were filed too
late. 2 The bankruptcy court noted that the claimants' failure to detect the
environmental contamination did not mean that the claimants could not have
detected the contamination. "[I]n this case the evidence demonstrates that all
of the physical events giving rise to [the claimants'] rights of action, if any,
occurred prior to the Confirmation Order and were capableof detection by
1-23
scientific means available to [the claimants] in 1988 ....
The court in Texaco held, in effect, that the release of hazardous
material alone could be the basis for a claim.24 The court further held that
this claim should have been raised during the debtor's bankruptcy,
irrespective of whether the claimants had any actual or constructive

16

'7
18

See id.
See id.
See id. at 942-43.

19See id.
See id. at 943.

20

21

See id.

22

See id. at 953-54.

23
24

Id. at 953 (emphasis added).
See id. at 951-52.
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knowledge of the release of hazardous materials. 25
[O]n the facts in this case there can be no doubt that [the
claimants'] claims ... are well within the broad statutory
definition of "claim" . . . . [The claimants'] claims were
neither contingent nor unmatured as of the Bar Date, and even
if unknown to [the claimants] at that time, their claims were
unquestionably capable of detection.26
In short, the debtor received a discharge from any responsibility for
hazardous materials that were released prior to the bankruptcy petition. The
key to this conclusion is that the capability of the claimants to detect
contamination (i.e., that the claim was discoverable by reasonable scientific
procedures) gave rise to the claimants' obligation to file. Failure to file a
discoverable, but undiscovered, environmental claim results in the discharge
of that claim just as it would result in the discharge of an undiscovered but
discoverable non-environmental claim.27
The ruling in Texaco went even further, however, in undercutting
environmental protection by stating that the debtor was not required to
identify the claimants as potential creditors holding an environmental claim.28
When Texaco sent its Notice of Bankruptcy to the claimants, the debtor failed
to list the claimants as creditors.29 The court held that the notice was not
defective.3"
[Elven assuming that [the debtor] knew there was a
possibility of a claim by [the claimants], [the debtor] was not
required to give actual notice to creditors 'with merely

25
26

See id. at 952-57.
Id. at 954 (emphasis added).

7 See id. at 956-57.
28

See id. at 955-57.

29 See id.
'o See id. at 957.
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conceivable, conjectural or speculative claims.' A fortiori,
[the debtor] had no Constitutional duty to give [the claimants]
some unique,
special notice tailored to environmental
claims." z
At most, the debtor was required to tell the claimants by mail or
publication that the debtor was filing for bankruptcy, with no other specifics
about the possible claims. 3 2 The court seemed to bend over backwards to
uphold the validity of the Notice of Bankruptcy; the court reasoned that even
if the debtor's failure to list the claimants as creditors was some violation of
bankruptcy law, the discharge was proper where the claimants actually
received the Notice of Bankruptcy:
Moreover, even if it could be said that [the debtor] violated
section 521 and Rule 1007 by failing to schedule [the
claimants] as creditors, [the claimants] have cited no authority
to support their argument that such failure should bar [the
debtor's] discharge, particularly since [the claimants] did
receive actual notice by mail or, in the case of the Sanders,
33
constructive notice by publication.
Furthermore, in spite of the fact that the debtor had knowledge of the
environmental problem,34 the court held that the failure to mention the

Id. (quoting Charter Crude Oil Co. v. Petroleos Mexicanos, 125 B.R. 650, 656 (Bankr.
M.D. Fla. 1991)).
3 See id. at 955.
3'

31

Id. at 957 (emphasis added).

34 The court stated:

This is not to say that the apparent migration from the pits did not
constitute an environmental 'problem,' or that Texaco was unaware of the
problem. Texaco forwarded the Woodward Clyde report to the Louisiana
Department of Environmental Quality ('DEQ') in December 1986,
communicated thereafter on an ongoing basis with officials of the DEQ
and has been implementing a program of remediation approved by the
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"environmental problem" in the disclosure statement did not constitute
defective notice.35 Therefore, the claimants received the notice and knew
that the debtor was filing for bankruptcy, but had no reason to believe that
there was an environmental problem or claim. In effect, the court in Texaco
placed the burden on all future recipients of any notice of bankruptcy to
discover and declare any potential environmental claims prior to the
bankruptcy discharge deadline, or face the loss of any such claim forever.
This ruling needs to be evaluated in light of the recent Seventh Circuit
36
decision in AM InternationalInc. v. DatacardCorp.
III. BRIEF SUMMARY OF THE AMINTERNA TIONAL CASE

"For nearly 25 years, AM International ("AMI") spilled hazardous
chemicals at an industrial site in Holmesville, Ohio."37 From 1959 to 1981,
AMI owned a manufacturing facility with two divisions. One of the divisions
used above-ground tanks to hold a solvent to clean copy machines. The tanks
were used to mix the ingredients for the solvent. There was at least one
major spill of"a couple of thousand gallons" prior to 1980.38
In November 1981, the debtor sold the property and one of the
divisions to DBS ("Buyer #1"). 39 The debtor gave a written warranty that the
property was in compliance with all laws.4" There is no evidence, however,
that Buyer #1 performed an environmental audit or other environmental
examination of the property, nor is there evidence that Buyer #1 had any
reason to believe such an examination to be necessary.4 ' The debtor leased

DEQ since 1988 or 1989.
Id. at 956 n.6.
"5See id. at 956-57.
36

146 B.R. 391 (Bankr. N.D. Ill 1992), aff'd in part, 106 F.3d 1342 (7th Cir. 1997).

" AM Int'l, 106 F.3d at 1345.
38 AM lnt'l, 146 BR. at 396.
39 See id.
40

See id.

41 See id. at 397.
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back that portion of the property that housed the tanks and the other division,
and continued operating on the premises. Some employees of the debtor
went to work for Buyer #1.42 From 1981 to 1985, both the debtor and
Buyer #1 conducted maintenance on the property. 3
In 1982, the debtor filed for Chapter 11 protection in Illinois. 4 The
debtor sent a notice of bankruptcy to Buyer #1, and Buyer #1 filed a proof of
claim.45 The debtor filed objections to Buyer #1's claims.46 In 1984, Buyer
#1 and the debtor entered into a settlement agreement.4 7 Each party released
all claims against the other party, however, there was no specific mention of
any environmental claims. 48 Later that year, the debtor's confirmation order
49
was signed. In 1985, the debtor ceased doing business and left the property.
In 1986, Datacard ("Buyer #2") conducted an environmental audit as
part of its due diligence prior to purchasing the site from Buyer #1.50
Buyer #2 discovered environmental contamination.5 Buyer #2 notified Ohio
EPA and the debtor of the contamination. 2 In August 1986, Buyer #2
proceeded with the purchase from Buyer #1 for $50 million. In accordance
with CERCLA, Buyer #2 then undertook a voluntary cleanup of the site,
ultimately expending some $150,000 and planning to recover those costs
from the responsible parties.53
In 1987, Buyer #2 sent a letter to the debtor regarding the cleanup
costs. The letter was designed to trigger the sixty day notice required under

42 See
41
44
45

id.

See id. at 396.
See id.
See id.

46 See id.
41 See id.
41 See id.
41

See id. at 397.

5o See id.

5' See id.
52 See id.

3 See id.
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the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act ("RCRA"), 54 the Federal Water

Pollution Control Act ("FWPCA"),55 and CERCLA.5 6 In response to the
letter, the debtor filed a lawsuit in federal court, demanding an injunction and
declaratory relief against Buyer #1 and Buyer #2, alleging that the cleanup
costs had been discharged in bankruptcy. Buyer #2 filed counterclaims
against the debtor for damages under CERCLA, RCRA, and state common
law."
The debtor filed a motion for partial summary judgment, which the
court granted in part, on the Buyers' counterclaims for nuisance, negligence,
trespass, and strict liability. 8 While considering the motion, the lower court
in AM International examined the Seventh Circuit's holding in In re
Chicago,Milwaukee, St. Paul & Pacific RailroadCo. ("Chicago /)59 that
foreseeability is an important factor for discharging claims.60 Specifically,
the lower court in AM Internationalnoted ChicagoI for the proposition that
"when a potential CERCLA claimant can tie the bankruptcy
debtor to a known release of a hazardous substance which this
potential claimant knows will lead to CERCLA response
costs, and when this potential claimant has, in fact, conducted
tests with regard to this contamination problem, then this
potential claimant has, at least, a contingent CERCLA
claim ...."61

The lower court in AM Internationalfocused on tying the CERCLA claim to
the polluter, stating that "a CERCLA claim does not arise for purpose of

14

See 42 U.S.C. § 6972 (1994).

" See 33 U.S.C. § 1365 (1994).
56 See 42 U.S.C. § 9607 (1994).

7 See AM Int'l, Inc. v. Datacard Corp., 146 B.R. 391, 397-98 (Bankr. N.D. 111.
1992).
5 See id. at 394.
'9974 F.2d 775 (7th Cir. 1992) [hereinafter Chicago 1].
60 See id. at 785.
61

AM lnt'l, 146 B.R. at 394 (quoting Chicago 1, 974 F.2d at 784) (emphasis added).
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dischargeability under bankruptcy law upon the mere release or threatened
release of hazardous substances. 62
From these propositions, the lower court in AM International
developed what appears to be a sliding scale standard: "[I]f information
before the potential CERCLA claimant had indicated that response costs were
imminent, the case for dischargeability becomes greater. '63 The court's test
for discharging cleanup costs was whether "the potential CERCLA claimant
has 'sufficient information to give rise to a claim or contingent CERCLA
claim' before the consummation date of the bankruptcy."' On that basis, the
court found that questions of fact existed regarding whether Buyer #2 had
sufficient information to give rise to a claim before the debtor's bankruptcy. 65
Thus, the lower court denied summary judgment on the CERCLA count of
the Buyers' counterclaim.66
Six years into the Illinois case, AMI filed for Chapter 11 protection
again, this time in Delaware. 67 The Delaware Bankruptcy Court lifted the
automatic stay of the Illinois case, and as a result there was a three day trial
in Illinois.68
After the trial, the debtor filed a post-trial brief requesting the claims
be disallowed, based on Bankruptcy Code section 502(e)(1)(B), which
disallows claims for reimbursement asserted by a co-liable party where the
claim is contingent.69 The Illinois court held that "the Delaware Bankruptcy
Court has exclusive jurisdiction over and should consider the allowance or
disallowance of Data Card's [sic] claims pursuant to Bankruptcy Code
§ 502(e)." 7 ° The court further found that the debtor waived the affirmative

62

Id. (citing Chicago 1, 974 F.2d at 784-85).

61 AMInt'l,
64

65
66

61
61

69

146 B.R. at 394.
Id. (quoting Chicago 1, 974 F.2d at 787).
See id.
See id.
See AM Int'l, Inc. v. Datacard Corp., 167 B.R. 110 (Bankr. N.D. I11.
1994).
See id.
See 11 U.S.C. § 502 (1994).

70 AMnt'O, 167 B.R. at 113.
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defense of disallowance by failing to raise it before or during the trial.71
Ultimately, the Illinois court entered judgment for Buyer #2, finding that
Buyer #2's claim had not been discharged and that Buyer #2 was entitled to
72
future cleanup costs.
The debtor filed an appeal to the Seventh Circuit challenging the
application of the "tie the debtor to the release" standard of claim accrual.73
Using a clear error standard of review, the Seventh Circuit ruled that the
"district court's factual finding that DBS did not have sufficient information
to tie AMI to environmental contamination before AMI's bankruptcy was
confirmed was not clearly erroneous." 74 The Seventh Circuit upheld the
lower court's decision, stating that the "district court's conclusion that
Datacard's CERCLA claims had not been discharged was not an abuse of
discretion. '75 The court neglected to mention, however, that at the time of
AMI's first bankruptcy filing, of which Buyer #1 had notice, the
contamination, and thus the claim, were clearly discoverable through readily
available scientific means, as was demonstrated when Buyer #2 conducted
its environmental audit of the site.76
IV. ANALYSIS OF THE ACCRUAL ISSUE

In both Texaco and AM International:(1) the contamination occurred
prior to filing for bankruptcy protection; (2) the contamination could have
been discovered by available testing methods; and, (3) the contamination was

7' See id.
72 See

id.

7 See AM Int'l, Inc. v. Datacard Corp., 106 F.3d 1342 (7th Cir. 1997).
Id. at 1348.

14

75

Id.

76

See AM Int'l, Inc. v. Datacard Corp., 146 B.R. 391, 397 (Bankr. N.D. I11.1992).
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unknown to the claimants" prior to the discharge date."8 However, in
Texaco, the cleanup costs were discharged, while in AM International,the
cleanup costs were not discharged.79 The inconsistent rulings in Texaco and
AM Internationalunderscore the tension between the public policy goal of
bankruptcy law of granting discharged debtors a "fresh start" and the public
policy of environmental law of promoting hazardous waste disposal and
imposing cleanup costs on the parties responsible for the contamination.
A. Accrual Occurs at the Time of Release
In Texaco, the cleanup claim accrued at the time of the release or
threatened release of the hazardous materials. Several courts support this
interpretation, including the bankruptcy court in the infamous case In Re
Chateaugay Corp.8" which stated that "response costs incurred by the [EPA]
under [CERCLA] are pre-petition 'claims,' dischargeable in bankruptcy,
regardless of when such costs were incurred, as long as they concern a
release or threatened release of hazardous substance that occurred before the
debtor filed its Chapter 11 petition."'" The court further reasoned:
The question, then, is whether claims which are neither
contingent nor unmatured, but which are unknown to the
claimants were intended by Congress to be covered by the
statutory definition of 'claim' so as to be barred by the
discharge. The decisions leave no doubt that environmental
claims, . . . even if unknown, are within the statutory

In AM nt 'l,
Buyer #2 was unaware of the contamination prior to Debtor's bankruptcy.

In fact, Buyer #2 had no connection to the property at the time of Debtor's bankruptcy. See
id. at 396.
78 See discussion supra Parts II-IL.
7 See discussion supra Parts II-III.
80
SI

944 F.2d 997 (2d Cir. 1991).
Id. at 999.
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definition of dischargeable 'claims.' 82
In Texaco, the court's emphasis on scientific detectability was based
on the claimant's assertion that the unmanifested and unknown claims of
Dalkon Shield users or workers exposed to asbestos particles were analogous
to unknown CERCLA claims.83 The court disagreed and found that mass tort
claims were materially different from CERCLA claims in that mass tort
claims were incapable of detection because the damage had not yet occurred
so as to give rise to a cause of action.84 By contrast, in CERCLA claims, the
damage occurred at the time of release of the hazardous materials.85
Even the court in Texaco noted that "in some circumstances it may
indeed be unfair, and impermissible, to apply the discharge provisions of the
Bankruptcy Code where a claimant would thereby be barred from asserting
otherwise valid claims which... through no fault of the claimant, could not
be asserted prior to confirmation."86 It seems unfair for the court to require
a claimant to identify a bankruptcy claim that the claimant has no reason to
know exists. Hypothetically, under the mere release standard, a polluter with
full knowledge of a potential environmental claim could fail to provide full
information to potential claimants, or perhaps even conceal the release of
hazardous waste from a claimant, declare bankruptcy and be released from
all liability for cleanup costs. Whether a court in such a situation would rule
that the contamination was discoverable with due diligence, and thus
discharge the bankruptcy claim, remains to be seen.
B. Accrual Occurs When a Connection Between the Debtor and the
Contaminationis Found

In order to avoid what we might call "no-fault-of-the-claimant"

82

Id. at 998.

8 See In re Texaco, Inc., 182 B.R. 937, 953 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1995).

See id. at 953-54.
s See id.
86 Id. at 950.
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unfairness, the Seventh Circuit in AM Internationalupheld the finding that
there was insufficient evidence to "tie" the debtor to the environmental
contamination, and concluded that the claim was not discharged. 7 The
Seventh Circuit based its decision on the Chicago 188 and Chicago I 9
decisions.9" The AM Internationalcourt examined the reasoning of the
ChicagoI court that, because the claimant had knowledge of contamination
and could "tie the bankruptcy debtor to a known release" before the cutoff
date for filing a claim, the late-filed claim was discharged.9 ' The Seventh
Circuit also noted Chicago II's holding that even if the claimant had no
subjective knowledge of the contamination, claims filed after the bankruptcy
bar date were discharged because the claimant should have known of the
contamination at the notorious Superfund site.92 Thus, according to the
ChicagoI and II decisions, if a claimant either knows or should know of the
contamination before the claim deadline, then the claim is discharged.
The Seventh Circuit distinguished the AM Internationalclaimants
from the Chicago I and II claimants noting that in AM Internationalthere
"had been no visible signs of contamination, no soil testing, no EPA
involvement, and no publicized spills at the.., site."93 The claimants "did
not have sufficient information to tie [the debtor] to environmental
contamination before [the debtor's] bankruptcy;" 94 therefore, the claim had

87

See AM Int'l, Inc. v. Datacard Corp., 106 F.3d 1342, 1347-48 (7th Cir. 1997).

s 974 F.2d 775 (7th Cir. 1992).
Chicago, Milwaukee, St. Paul & Pac. R.R. Co. v. Union Pac. R.R., 3 F.3d 200 (7th Cir.

1993) [hereinafter Chicago I1].
90 See AM Int'l, 106 F.3d at 1347-48.
91 See id. at 1347 (quoting Chicago 1, 974 F.2d 775, 786 (7th Cir. 1992)).
92

See id. at 1347-48 (citing Chicago H, 3 F.3d at 203-07).

93

Id. at 1348.

94

Id.
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not been discharged.95
C. Accrual and the "FairContemplation" of the Parties
Other courts have focused less on the connection between the
pollution and the polluter and have focused more on the foreseeability of the
claims. Some courts have adopted the "fairly contemplated" standard.9" In
In re National Gypsum Co.,97 the court held that all liability arising from
pre-petition conduct at the relevant contaminated sites not yet listed by the
EPA, but fairly within the contemplation of the parties, was discharged.98
Specifically, all claims that were within the actual or presumed contemplation
of the parties at the time the original relationship between the parties was
created, would be discharged.99 All claims that were not contemplated would

" Of course, what the court overlooks is the fact that had the claimant looked, it would

have found the contamination and would have been able to tie the debtor to the spill.
Whether the claimant should be expected to look for a problem is the real issue, and one
sidestepped by the Seventh Circuit.
6 Texaco's application of the mere release accrual test and AM International'sapplication
of the "tie debtor to the release" accrual test subtly spumed the "fairly contemplated" test.
In re National Gypsum Co., 139 B.R. 397 (Bankr. N.D. Tex 1992), introduced the "fairly
contemplated" test, and other courts soon followed. See, e.g., In re Buttes, 182 B.R. 493,
494 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. 1994) (affirming the fairly contemplated test and stating that National
Gypsum "requires that the parties fairly contemplated the environmental hazard and
necessary cleanup expenses at the time of the debtor's bankruptcy for it to be a claim in the
bankruptcy proceeding."); In re Goodwin, 163 B.R. 825, 830 (Bankr. D. Idaho 1993)
(questioning Chateaugay'sreasoning and affirming NationalGypsum's holding that "the
only meaningful distinction that can be made regarding CERCLA claims in bankruptcy is
one that distinguishes between costs associated with pre-petition conduct resulting in the
release or threat of a release that could have been 'fairly' contemplated by the parties; and
those that could not have been 'fairly' contemplated by the parties." (quoting National
Gypsum, 139 B.R. at 407-08)); see also Mesiti v. Microdot, Inc., 156 B.R. 113 (Bankr.
D.N.H. 1993) (applying the reasonably foreseeable test where the claimant had no idea of
claim until after reorganization order was issued).
9 139 B.R. 397 (Bankr. N.D. Tex 1992).
9 See id. at 415.
0 See id.
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not be discharged. Factors considered included:
(1) Knowledge of the parties of the site in which a PRP
[potentially responsible party] may be liable;
(2) National Priority Listing;
(3) EPA notification to the debtor of PRP liability;
(4) commencement of investigation and cleanup activities;
and
(5) incurrence of cleanup costs.l°°
Numerous courts have wrestled with the accrual of claim issue,
resulting in a variety of tests, including the Texaco "mere release" test, the
AM International "tie the debtor to the release" test, and the National
Gypsum "fairly contemplated" test.'0 ' The accrual issue is further
complicated by a subsequent buyer who had no interest in the property at the
time of the bankruptcy and, therefore, did not receive from the debtor any
notice of the bankruptcy. How can a cleanup cost claim accrue against a
claimant who, in terms of interest in the property, did not exist at the time of
the bankruptcy?
In AM International,Buyer #1 received notice of the debtor's first
bankruptcy and filed a proof of claim.0 2 The debtor argued that there were
multiple opportunities for Buyer #1 to be aware of the release of hazardous
materials, including joint maintenance of the property prior to the debtor's
first bankruptcy and the employment of former employees of the debtor. 103
However, Buyer #1 settled its claim and executed a release.0 4
Buyer #1's settlement of all claims, in effect, resulted in a situation
where Buyer #2 possessed more rights to cleanup costs than Buyer #1.
According to the Seventh Circuit in AM International,an innocent landowner

100 Id.
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See discussion supra Parts IV.A., C.

See AM Int'l, Inc. v. Datacard Corp., 146 B.R. 391, 396 (Bankr. N.D. I11.1992).
'0' See id.
104 See id.
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can file a CERCLA lawsuit directly against a third party for spilling waste." 5
The Seventh Circuit reasoned:
Datacard did not take part in the manufacture of Blankrola.
Instead, Datacard-like a party forced to cleanup
contamination on its property due to a third party's
spill-faces liability merely due to its status as landowner.
As a result, Datacard qualifies under Akzo's exception and
06
can directly pursue its response costs under § 107(a)(4)(B).1
However, the Seventh Circuit also noted that Datacard "presumably
paid less for DBS because it knew it was buying into an expensive
cleanup.' 0 7 Datacard knowingly purchased contaminated land and factored
08
the price of the cleanup into its decision to buy the contaminated property.1
"Despite the [hazardous material] find, Datacard went ahead with the
purchase, figuring it had a good shot at recovering its cleanup costs from
AMI and that the cleanup would only run about $350,000--small change in
comparison to the $52 million it was shelling out to buy DBS."' 9
Assuming Datacard got a discount in the sale price, Datacard received
a windfall by paying less for the property and collecting additional money
from the debtor. Moreover, the Seventh Circuit did not address the issue
raised in the Magistrate's Report in the lower court, which stated:
AMI is correct in arguing that the proposition that Data
Card's [sic] argument cannot be squared with the Bankruptcy
Code. A debtor that provides notice to all parties who may
have claims against the debtor relating to a piece of property
cannot lose the benefit of its discharge because another party

'o' See 106 F.3d 1342, 1347 (7th Cir. 1997).
106 Id. (citing Akzo Coating, Inc. v. Aigner Corp., 30 F.3d 761 (7th Cir. 1994).
'07 Id. at 1346.
0'

See id.
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WM. & MARY ENVTL. L.

& POL'Y REV.

[Vol. 22:163

acquires title to the property at some future date. The efficacy
of the debtor's discharge would then be subject to subsequent
conveyances of the property over which the debtor has no
control. This scheme would end-run around the policies
which provide for a "fresh start" to the debtor. Thus, it is
inappropriate for Data Card [sic] to contend that the motion
for summary judgment should be denied because Data Card
[sic] was never given notice."'
V. CONCLUSION

The presence of at least three different accrual tests underscores the
unresolved conflict between bankruptcy law and environmental law. Not
only does the conflict between environmental public policy and bankruptcy
public policy remain unsettled, but also the fundamental issue of accrual
timing remains without definitive resolution. Clearly, depending on which
of the accrual tests a court adopts, the obligations of a claimant holding
undiscovered, but discoverable, environmental claims against the debtor will
differ. It is intolerable that the rights one has against a debtor may depend on
mere chance, on the jurisdiction in which one resides. However, as the law
stands now, one claimant might lose claims because of a failure to look for
something that she has no reason to believe exists while a neighbor one state
away would not. Such a situation serves the goals of neither bankruptcy nor
environmental law.

'l AM Int'l, 146 B.R. at 403.

